As the Taliban advances and claims to gain control in parts of Afghanistan, it has been predicted that the Taliban's offensive will be in Kabul, while it will face strong resistance in the surrounding four major cities, i.e. Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Jalalabad in the east, Kandahar in the south, and Herat in the west. If the Taliban's offensive is unable to sustain, in order to control the occupied areas and to disperse the deployment, there is a high probability that Afghanistan will see a stalemate of urban-rural divide.

Under such situation, Afghanistan will pose a certain degree of threat to China:

1. Drug trade: Afghanistan is the world's largest opium producer, and this will pose a significant pressure on China's drug control.

2: Infiltration of terrorist organizations: The Taliban does not have the ability to control all of its branches and the Afghan tribes, and will not be able to prevent large-scale infiltration of terrorists into China.

3. Hostage crisis and casualties: While China publicly declared that the Taliban is a political organization, the actual organizational structure of the Taliban has proven that it is not one that is well-organized and reliable. Therefore, Chinese could very well still become targets in Afghanistan, and it may be difficult to avoid hostage crises and casualties that involve Chinese.

4. Threats on oil and gas pipelines: While oil and gas pipelines in western China do not pass through Afghanistan, the Taliban's area of influence has expanded to the surrounding region, and it continues to infiltrate and expand, thereby posing a threat to China's energy security.

5. Taliban-Afghan government relations: The Afghan embassy remains in China, and likewise the Chinese embassy in Kabul is still functioning. Which Afghan government does China recognize? The Taliban, or the existing Afghan government? How should China explain its position on Afghanistan to international organizations like the United Nations?

6. China-Russian relations: As both countries have certain common interests in the region, and with the situation in Central Asia becoming increasingly complicated, Russia will inevitably accumulate its force in Central Asia and deploy more troops and equipment. This is, of course, its ambition of becoming the dominant force in the five Central Asian countries again, thereby breaking the political and military balance of Central Asia. Will China participate in Russia's joint operations and recognize Russia as the dominant force, or will it adhere to its independent line? This remains an open question.

7. China-Pakistan relations: There is a certain degree of relationship between Tehrik-i-Taliban and Afghan Taliban. Now Tehrik-i-Taliban's armed forces are in Afghanistan, and Pakistan is unwilling to resolve the Taliban's presence in its own soil. Therefore, if the Taliban control Afghanistan in the future, it will have an impact on China-Pakistani relations, and there is a possibility of change.

8. China's policy might be hijacked by the Taliban: Due to the large amount of Chinese investment and personnel in Afghanistan in the past, it is unlikely that these Chinese assets will be discarded, and in addition Chinese embassy and diplomats are still in Kabul. These may now become a bargaining chip for the Taliban when negotiating with China, and when things do not turn well for the Taliban these Chinese asset might be held hostage. In fact, even now the Taliban might force the Chinese government to make a choice, and the choice of the Chinese government is greatly related to China's status in the world, as it could be accused as supporting the Taliban terrorist organization.

China's foreign affairs department has made a high-profile announcement of its negotiation with the Taliban, and this is a hasty move. The ideal approach should be closed-door negotiation, rather than such formal and official high-profile one. This will cause China's maneuver space to be compressed, and Taliban has already taken advantage of China. China must step out of the simplistic thoughts that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" or "one can only be either my enemy or my friend", so that it can form its own proper Central Asia policy.