We have already seen the new changes brought about by the war in Ukraine. Common sense allows us to recognize that the theory of modern warfare has undergone subtle changes as a result of it. What is worth discussing is exactly what these changes are.
After observing the war in Ukraine in its entirety from last summer to this spring, starting from Ukraine's public announcement in 2013 to recapture Crimea, reclaim Ukrainian territory, and achieve breakthroughs, I have almost monitored the frontline reports of Ukraine every single day, conducting tracking and research. All in all, the results have been disappointing. Ukraine, while achieving successes earlier, now suffered major defeats, with casualties and morale beginning to decline.
How should modern warfare be fought? How should we view modern warfare? It seems that Volodymyr Zelenskyy has not addressed this issue well. His sense of warfare seems to be still rooted in outdated but widely accepted theories.
Taking these factors into account, drawing from my previous presentations on Ukraine and modern warfare, I offer additional insights and outline the emerging principles of modern warfare.
It is crucial to note that in modern warfare, there is no longer a distinction between "offense" and "defense". Both sides are initially in a state of confrontation, with the front line being dynamic and mobile. Therefore, dynamic confrontation is the fundamental form of modern warfare. When the enemy approaches, there must be planned defense and withdrawal, with the primary focus being to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. In modern warfare, combat essentially entails causing the enemy maximum harm, rendering them combat ineffective. With no distinct "offense" and "defense" in dynamic confrontation, what remains is maneuver warfare, focusing on inflicting maximum damage on the enemy until they become unsustainable, thus revealing the outcome of the war.
In fact, with the widespread use of modern warfare and long-range weapons, there is no longer a distinction between the "front line" and the "rear area". and the concepts of "offense" and "defense" have also become obsolete, and this is a significant theoretical advancement. It appears that President Zelenskyy may not fully grasp these changes in warfare theory. Therefore, his strategic objective remains to "recapture Crimea". In reality, without inflicting significant damage on Russia's overall national and military strength, how could Ukraine possibly recapture Crimea? Conversely, it is also possible for Russia to inflict considerable damage on Ukraine, indicating that Russia may cause substantial harm to it.
As a result, Ukraine failed.
Now, all theories from the World War II era are obsolete. Expectations of breakthroughs, occupations, and large-scale encirclements of heavy troops have become unrealistic and old-fashioned war vocabulary in the movies. In modern warfare, it all boils down to one thing: crushing the opponent first before you get crushed.
Therefore, in modern warfare, the side with resource advantages has inherent superiority and can completely defeat the side with disadvantages in this aspect. Hence, sanctions are entirely effective, especially as time goes on, this effectiveness will become undeniable. In this situation, the sanctioned party, due to limited war resources, will find the destructive effects of modern warfare unbearable and will ultimately fail.
All of these understandings related to emerging theories of warfare may be beneficial to Ukraine. Ukraine should proactively maintain its war alliances and work hard on this, which is crucial for maximizing the damage to Russia. The world will surely see the day when the damage inflicted on Russia by modern warfare is irreparable. Russia, unable to bear it, will come to the negotiating table and admit the defeat.
